Runtime enforcement is a dynamic analysis technique that uses monitors to enforce the behaviour specified by some correctness property on an executing system. The enforceability of a logic captures the extent to which the properties expressible via the logic can be enforced at runtime. We study the enforceability of Hennessy-Milner Logic with Recursion (µHML) with respect to suppression enforcement. We develop an operational framework for enforcement which we then use to formalise when a monitor enforces a µHML property. We also show that the safety syntactic fragment of the logic, sHML, is enforceable by providing an automated synthesis function that generates correct suppression monitors from sHML formulas.
Introduction
Runtime monitoring [24, 26] is a dynamic analysis technique that is becoming increasingly popular in the turbid world of software development. It uses code units called monitors to aggregate system information, compare system execution against correctness specifications, or steer the execution of the observed system. The technique has been used effectively to offload certain verification tasks to a post-deployment phase, thus complementing other (static) analysis techniques in multi-pronged verification strategies-see e.g., [7, 14, 29, 20, 30] . Runtime enforcement (RE) [35, 36, 23 ] is a specialized monitoring technique, used to ensure that the behaviour of a system-under-scrutiny (SuS) is always in agreement with some correctness specification. It employs a specific kind of monitor (referred to as a transducer [11, 44, 5] or an edit-automaton [35, 36] ) to anticipate incorrect behaviour and counter it. Such a monitor thus acts as a proxy between the SuS and the surrounding
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and possibility modal operators with symbolic actions, [ p, c ] ϕ and p, c ϕ, where bv(p) bind free data variables in c and ϕ. Formulas in µHML are interpreted over the system powerset domain where S∈P (Sys) . The semantic definition of Figure 1 , ϕ, ρ , is given for both open and closed formulas. It employs a valuation from logical variables to sets of states, ρ ∈ (LVar → P(Sys)), which permits an inductive definition on the structure of the formulas; ρ = ρ[X → S] denotes a valuation where ρ (X) = S and ρ (Y ) = ρ(Y ) for all other Y = X. The only non-standard cases are those for the modal formulas, due to the use of symbolic actions. Note that we recover the standard logic for symbolic actions p, c whose pattern p does not contain variables (p=α for some α) and whose condition holds trivially (c=true); in such cases we write [α]ϕ and α ϕ for short. We generally assume closed formulas, i.e., without free logical and data variables, and write ϕ in lieu of ϕ, ρ since the interpretation of a closed ϕ is independent of ρ. A system s satisfies formula ϕ whenever s ∈ ϕ whereas a formula ϕ is satisfiable, ϕ ∈ Sat, whenever there exists a system r such that r ∈ ϕ .
Example 1. Consider two systems (a good system, s g , and a bad one, s b ) implementing a server that interacts on port i, repeatedly accepting requests that are answered by outputting on the same port, and terminating the service once a close request is accepted (on the same port). Whereas s g outputs an answer (i!ans) for every request (i?req), s b occasionally refuses to answer a given request (see the underlined branch (max X. ( . . . ) ) requiring that whenever a system interacting on i inputs a request, it cannot input a subsequent request, i.e., [i?req]ff, unless it outputs an answer beforehand, in which case the formula recurses, i.e., [i!ans]X. Using symbolic actions, we can generalise ϕ 0 by requiring the property to hold for any interaction happening on any port number except j. 
An Operational Model for Enforcement
Our operational mechanism for enforcing properties over systems uses the (symbolic) transducers m, n ∈ Trn defined in Figure 2 . The transition rules in Figure − −− → n denotes the fact that the transducer in state m transforms the visible action α (produced by the system) into the action µ (which can possibly become silent) and transitions into state n. In this sense, the transducer action α τ represents the suppression of action α, action α β represents the replacing of α by β, and α α denotes the identity transformation. The special case • α encodes the insertion of α, where • represents that the transition is not induced by any system action.
The key transition rule in Figure 2 is eTrn. It states that the symbolic-prefix transducer p, c, p .m can transform an (extended) action γ into the concrete action µ, as long as the action matches with pattern p with substitution σ, mtch(p, γ)=σ, and the condition is satisfied by σ, cσ ⇓ true (the matching function is lifted to extended actions and patterns in the obvious way, where mtch(•, •)=∅). In such a case, the transformed action is µ=p σ, i.e., the action µ resulting from the instantiation of the free data variables in pattern p with the corresponding values mapped by σ, and the transducer state reached is mσ. By contrast, in rule eId, the transducer id acts as the identity and leaves actions unchanged. The remaining rules are fairly standard and unremarkable. Figure 2 also describes an instrumentation relation which relates the behaviour of the SuS s with the transformations of a transducer monitor m that agrees with the (observable) actions Act of s. The term m[s] thus denotes the resulting monitored system whose behaviour is defined in terms of Act ∪ {τ } from the system's LTS. Concretely, rule iTrn states that when a system s transitions with an observable action α to s and the transducer m can transform this action into µ and transition to n, the instrumented system m[s] transitions with action µ to n[s ]. However, when s transitions with a silent action, rules iAsy allows it to do so independently of the transducer. Dually, rule iIns allows the transducer to insert an action µ independently of s's behaviour. Rule iTer is analogous to standard monitor instrumentation rules for premature termination of the transducer [24, 27, 25, 1] , and accounts for underspecification of transformations. Thus, if a system s transitions with an observable action α to s , and the transducer m does not specify how to transform it (m α − →), nor can it transition to a new transducer state by inserting an action (m • − →), the system is still allowed to transition while the transducer's transformation activity is ceased, i.e., it acts like the identity id from that point onwards. 
By contrast, m r transforms input actions with either payload req or cls and output actions with payload ans on any port name, into the respective actions on port j. For instance:
Consider now the two suppression transducers m s and m t for actions on ports other than j:
Monitor m s suppresses any requests on ports other than j, and continues to do so after any answers on such ports. When instrumented with s b , we can observe the following behaviour:
Note that m s does not specify a transformation behaviour for when the monitored system produces inputs with payload other than req. 
Enforceability
The enforceability of a logic rests on the relationship between the semantic behaviour specified by the logic on the one hand, and the ability of the operational mechanism (the transducers and instrumentation of Section 3 in our case) to enforce the specified behaviour on the other.
Definition 3 (Enforceability).
A logic L is enforceable iff every formula ϕ∈L is enforceable. A formula ϕ is enforceable iff there exists a transducer m such that m enforces ϕ.
Definition 3 depends on what is considered to be an adequate definition for "m enforces ϕ". It is reasonable to expect that the latter definition should concern any system that the transducer m-hereafter referred to as the enforcer-is instrumented with. In particular, for any system s, the resulting composite system obtained from instrumenting the enforcer m with it should satisfy the property of interest, ϕ, whenever this property is satisfiable. By some measures, sound enforcement is a relatively weak requirement for adequate enforcement as it does not regulate the extent of the induced enforcement. More concretely, consider the case of enforcer m s from Example 2. Although m s manages to suppress the violating executions of system s b , thereby bringing it in line with property ϕ 1 , it needlessly modifies the behaviour of s g (namely it prohibits it from producing any inputs with req on port numbers that are not j), even though it satisfies ϕ 1 . Thus, in addition to sound enforcement we require a transparency condition for adequate enforcement. The requirement dictates that whenever a system s already satisfies the property ϕ, the assigned enforcer m should not alter the behaviour of s. Put differently, the behaviour of the enforced system should be behaviourally equivalent to the original system. Figure 3 The syntax for the safety µHML fragment, sHML.
Definition 4 (Sound Enforcement
m i [s b ] ∈ ϕ 1 , since m i [s b ] i?req − −−− → · i!ans −−−→ id[s b ] i?req − −−− → id[s b ] i?req − −−− → id[s b ].
Definition 6 (Transparent Enforcement
fact be able to suppress the offending actions produced by s ra , thus obtaining m r [s ra ] ∈ ϕ ns . However, it would also suppress the sole action i?req produced by the system s r , even though this system satisfies ϕ ns . This would, in turn, violate the transparency criterion of Definition 6 since it needlessly suppresses s r 's actions, i.e., although s r ∈ ϕ ns we have m r [s r ] ∼ s r . The intuitive reason for this problem is that a monitor cannot, in principle, look into the computation graph of a system, but is limited to the behaviour the system exhibits at runtime.
Synthesising Suppression Enforcers
Despite their merits, Definitions 3 and 8 are not easy to work with. The universal quantifications over all systems in Definitions 4 and 6 make it hard to establish that a monitor correctly enforces a property. Moreover, according to Definition 3, in order to determine whether a particular property is enforceable or not, one would need to show the existence of a monitor that correctly enforces it; put differently, showing that a property is not enforceable entails another universal quantification, this time showing that no monitor can possibly enforce the property. Lifting the question of enforceability to the level of a (sub)logic entails a further universal quantification, this time on all the logical formulas of the logic; this is often an infinite set.We address these problems in two ways. First, we identify a non-trivial syntactic subset of µHML that is guaranteed to be enforceable; in a multi-pronged approach to system verification, this could act as a guide for whether the property should be considered at a predeployment or post-deployment phase. Second, for every formula ϕ in this enforceable subset, we provide an automated procedure to synthesise a monitor m from it that correctly enforces ϕ when instrumented over arbitrary systems, according to Definition 8. This procedure can then be used as a basis for constructing tools that automate property enforcement. In this paper, we limit our enforceability study to suppression monitors, transducers that are only allowed to intervene by dropping (observable) actions. Despite being more constrained, suppression monitors side-step problems associated with what data to use in a payload-carrying action generated by the enforcer, as in the case of insertion and replacement monitors: the notion of a default value for certain data domains is not always immediate. Moreover, suppression monitors are particularly useful for enforcing safety properties, as shown in [35, 12, 22] . Intuitively, a suppression monitor would suppress actions as soon as it becomes apparent that a violation is about to be committed by the SuS. Such an intervention intrinsically relies on the detection of a violation. To this effect, we use a prior result from [27] , which identified a maximally-expressive logical fragment of µHML that can be handled by violation-detecting (recogniser) monitors. We thus limit our enforceability study to this maximal safety fragment, called sHML, since a transparent suppression monitor cannot judiciously suppress actions without first detecting a (potential) violation. Figure 3 recalls the syntax for sHML. The logic is restricted to truth and falsehood (tt and ff), conjunctions ( i∈I ϕ), and necessity modalities ([ p, c ] ϕ), while recursion may only be expressed through greatest fixpoints (max X.ϕ); the semantics follows that of Figure 1 .
A standard way how to achieve our aims would be to (i) define a (total) synthesis function − :: sHML → Trn from sHML formulas to suppression monitors and (ii) then show that for any ϕ ∈ sHML, the synthesised monitor ϕ enforces ϕ. Moreover, we would also require the synthesis function to be compositional, whereby the definition of the enforcer for a composite formula is defined in terms of the enforcers obtained for the constituent subformulas. There are a number of reasons for this requirement. For one, it would simplify our analysis of the produced monitors and allow us to use standard inductive proof techniques to prove properties about the synthesis function, such as the aforementioned criteria (ii). However, a naive approach to such a scheme is bound to fail, as discussed in the next example.
Example 10. Consider a semantically equivalent reformulation of ϕ 1 from Example 1.
At an intuitive level, the suppression monitor that one would expect to obtain for the subformula ϕ 2
, an enforcer that repeatedly drops any req inputs following a req input on the same port), whereas the monitor obtained for the subformula ϕ 2
x (assuming some variable mapping from X to x). These monitors would then be combined in the synthesis for max X.ϕ 2 ∧ϕ 2 as 
Instead of complicating our synthesis function to cater for anomalies such as those presented in Example 10-also making it less compositional in the process-we opted for a two stage synthesis procedure. First, we consider a normalised subset for sHML formulas which is amenable to a (straightforward) synthesis function definition that is compositional. This also facilitates the proofs for the conditions required by Definition 8 for any synthesised enforcer. Second, we show that every sHML formula can be reformulated in this normalised form without affecting its semantic meaning. We can then show that our two-stage approach is expressive enough to show the enforceability for all of sHML.
Definition 11 (sHML normal form). The set of normalised sHML formulas is defined as:
The above grammar combines necessity operators with conjunctions into one construct
Normalised sHML formulas are required to satisfy two further conditions:
For every max X.ϕ we have X ∈ fv(ϕ).
In a (closed) normalised sHML formula, the basic terms tt and ff can never appear unguarded unless they are at the top level (e.g., we can never have ϕ∧ff or max X 0 . . . . max X n .ff). Moreover, in any conjunction of necessity subformulas, i∈I [ p i , c i ]ϕ i , the necessity guards are disjoint and at most one necessity guard can satisfy any particular action.
Definition 12. The synthesis function − : sHML nf → Trn is defined inductively as:
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The synthesis function is compositional. It assumes a bijective mapping between formula variables and monitor recursion variables and converts logical variables X accordingly, whereas maximal fixpoints, max X.ϕ, are converted into the corresponding recursive enforcer. The synthesis also converts truth and falsehood formulas, tt and ff, into the identity enforcer Example 13. Recall formula ϕ 1 from Example 1, recast in term of sHML nf 's grammar:
Using the synthesis function defined in Definition 12, we can generate the enforcer
which can be optimized by removing redundant recursive constructs (e.g., rec z._), obtaining:
We now present the first main result to the paper.
Theorem 14 (Enforcement). The (sub)logic sHML nf is enforceable.
Proof. By Definition 3, the result follows if we show that for all ϕ ∈ sHML nf , ϕ enforces ϕ. By Definition 8, this is a corollary following from Propositions 15 and 16 stated below.
Proposition 15 (Enforcement Soundness). For every system s ∈ Sys and ϕ
∈ sHML nf then ϕ ∈ Sat implies ϕ [s] ∈ ϕ .
Proposition 16 (Enforcement Transparency). For every system s ∈ Sys and ϕ
Following Theorem 14, to show that sHML is an enforceable logic, we only need to show that for every ϕ ∈ sHML there exists a corresponding ψ ∈ sHML nf with the same semantic meaning, i.e., ϕ = ψ . In fact, we go a step further and provide a constructive proof using a transformation − : sHML → sHML nf that derives a semantically equivalent sHML nf formula from a standard sHML formula. As a result, from an arbitrary sHML formula ϕ we can then automatically synthesise a correct enforcer using ϕ which is useful for tool construction.
Our transformation ϕ relies on a number of steps; here we provide an outline of these steps. First, we assume sHML formulas that only use symbolic actions with normalised patterns p, i.e., patterns that do not use any data or free data variables (but they may use bound data variables). In fact, any symbolic action p, c can be easily converted into a corresponding one using normalised patterns as shown in the next example.
Example 17. Consider the symbolic action d!ans, d = j . It may be converted to a corresponding normalised symbolic action by replacing every occurrence of a data or free data variable in the pattern by a fresh bound variable, and then add an equality constraint between the fresh variable and the data or data variable it replaces in the pattern condition. In our case, we would obtain (e)!(f ), d =j ∧ e=d ∧ f =ans .
Our algorithm for converting sHML formulas (with normalised patterns) to sHML nf formulas, − , is based on Rabinovich's work [43] for determinising systems of equations which, in turn relies on the standard powerset construction for converting NFAs into DFAs. It consists in the following six stages that we outline below: 1. We unfold each recursive construct in the formula, to push recursive definitions inside the formula body. E.g., the formula max X.
The formula is converted into a system of equations. E.g., the expanded formula from the previous stage is converted into the set
For every equation, the symbolic actions in the right hand side that are of the same kind are alpha-converted so that their bound variables match. E.g., 
For equations with branches having syntactically equivalent symbolic actions, we carry out a unification procedure akin to standard powerset constructions. E.g., we convert the equation from the previous step to
using the (unified) fresh variables X {0} , X {1} and X {0,1} . 6. From the unified set of equations we generate again the sHML formula starting from X {0} . This procedure may generate redundant recursion binders, i.e., max X.ϕ where X ∈ fv(ϕ), and we filter these out in a subsequent pass.
We now state the second main result of the paper.
Theorem 18 (Normalisation). For any ϕ∈sHML there exists
Proof. The witness formula in normal form is ϕ , where we show that each and every stage in the translation procedure preserves semantic equivalence.
Alternative Transparency Enforcement
Transparency for a property ϕ, Definition 6, only restricts enforcers from modifying the behaviour of satisfying systems, i.e., when s∈ ϕ , but fails to specify any enforcement behaviour for the cases when the SuS violates the property s / ∈ ϕ . In this section, we consider an alternative transparency requirement for a property ϕ that incorporates the expected enforcement behaviour for both satisfying and violating systems. More concretely, in the case of safety languages such as sHML, a system typically violates a property along a specific set of execution traces; in the case of a satisfying system this set of "violating traces" is empty. However, not every behaviour of a violating system would be part of this set of violating traces and, in such cases, the respective enforcer should be required to leave the generated behaviour unaffected.
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Definition 19 (Violating-Trace Semantics). A logic L with an interpretation over systems − : L → P(Sys) has a violating-trace semantics whenever it has a secondary interpretation − v : L → P(Sys × Act * ) satisfying the following conditions for all ϕ ∈ L:
We adapt the work in [28] to give sHML a violating-trace semantics. Intuitively, the judgement (s, t) ∈ ϕ v according to Definition 20 below, denotes the fact that s violates the sHML property ϕ along trace t.
Definition 20 (Alternative Semantics for sHML [28] ). The forcing relation v ⊆ Sys × Act * × sHML is the least relation satisfying the following rules:
We write s, Equipped with Definition 20 we can define an alternative definition for transparency that concerns itself with preserving exhibited traces that are non-violating. We can then show that the monitor synthesis for sHML of Definition 12 observes non-violating trace transparency.
Definition 23 (Non-Violating Trace Transparency). An enforcer m is transparent with respect to the non-violating traces of a formula ϕ, denoted as nvtenf(m, ϕ), iff for all s ∈ Sys and t ∈ Act * , when s, t v ϕ then
for some m , and
Proposition 24 (Non-Violating Trace Transparency). For all ϕ ∈ sHML, s ∈ Sys and t ∈ Act * , when s, t v ϕ then
, and
We can thus obtain a new definition for "m enforces ϕ" instead of Definition 8 by requiring sound enforcement, Definition 6, and non-violating trace transparency, Definition 23 (instead of the transparent enforcement of Definition 6). This in turn gives us a new definition for enforceability for a logic, akin to Definition 3. Using Propositions 15 and 24, one can show that sHML is also enforceable with respect to the new definition as well.
Conclusion
This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the enforceability of properties expressed in a process logic. We have focussed on a highly expressive and standard logic, µHML, and studied the ability to enforce µHML properties via a specific kind of monitor that performs suppression-based enforcement. We concluded that sHML, identified in earlier work as a maximally expressive safety fragment of µHML, is also an enforceable logic. To show this, we first defined enforceability for logics and system descriptions interpreted over labelled transition systems. Although enforceability builds upon soundness and transparency requirements that have been considered in other work, our branching-time framework allowed us to consider novel definitions for these requirements. We also contend that the definitions that we develop for the enforcement framework are fairly modular: e.g., the instrumentation relation is independent of the specific language constructs defining our transducer monitors and it functions as expected as long as the transition semantics of the transducer and the system are in agreement. Based on this notion of enforcement, we devise a two-phase procedure to synthesise correct enforcement monitors. We first identify a syntactic subset of our target logic sHML that affords certain structural properties and permits a compositional definition of the synthesis function. We then show that, by augmenting existing rewriting techniques to our setting, we can convert any sHML formula into this syntactic subset.
Related Work
In his seminal work [46] , Schneider regards a property (in a linear-time setting) to be enforceable if its violation can be detected by a truncation automaton, and prevents its occurrence via system termination; by preventing misbehaviour, these enforcers can only enforce safety properties. Ligatti et al. in [35] extended this work via edit automata-an enforcement mechanism capable of suppressing and inserting system actions. A property is thus enforceable if it can be expressed as an edit automaton that transforms invalid executions into valid ones via suppressions and insertions. Edit automata are capable of enforcing instances of safety and liveness properties, along with other properties such as infinite renewal properties [35, 12] . As a means to assess the correctness of these automata, the authors introduced soundness and transparency. In both of these settings, there is no clear separation between the specification and the enforcement mechanism, and properties are encoded in terms of the languages accepted by the enforcement model itself, i.e., as edit/truncation automata. By contrast, we keep the specification and verification aspects of the logic separate. Bielova et al. [12, 13] remark that soundness and transparency do not specify to what extent a transducer should modify an invalid execution. They thus introduce a predictability criterion to prevent transducers from transforming invalid executions arbitrarily. More concretely, a transducer is predictable if one can predict the number of transformations that it will apply in order to transform an invalid execution into a valid one, thereby preventing enforcers from applying unnecessary transformations over an invalid execution. Using this notion, Bielova et al. thus devise a more stringent notion of enforceability. Although we do not explore this avenue, Definition 23 may be viewed as an attempt to constrain transformations of violating systems in a branching-time setup, and should be complementary to these predictability requirements.
Könighofer et al. in [31] present a synthesis algorithm that produces action replacement transducers called shields from safety properties encoded as automata-based specifications. Shields analyse the inputs and outputs of a reactive systems and enforce properties by C O N C U R 2 0 1 8
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On Runtime Enforcement via Suppressions modifying the least amount of output actions whenever the system deviates from the specified behaviour. By definition, shields should adhere to two desired properties, namely correctness and minimum deviation which are, in some sense, analogous to soundness and transparency respectively. Falcone et al. in [21, 23, 22] , also propose synthesis procedures to translate properties − expressed as Streett automata − into the resp., enforcers. The authors show that most of the property classes defined within the Safety-Progress hierarchy [42] are enforceable, as they can be encoded as Streett automata and subsequently converted into enforcement automata. As opposed to Ligatti et al., both Könighofer et al. and Falcone et al. separate the specification of the property from the enforcement mechanism, but unlike our work they do not study the enforceability of a branching time logic.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other work that tackles enforceability for the modal µ-calculus [32] (a reformulation of µHML) is that of Martinelli et al. in [38, 39] . Their approach is, however, different from ours. In addition to the µ-calculus formula to enforce, their synthesis function also takes a "witness" system satisfying the formula as a parameter. This witness system is then used as the behaviour that is mimicked by the instrumentation via suppression, insertion or replacement mechanisms. Although the authors do not explore automated correctness criteria such as the ones we study in this work, it would be interesting to explore the applicability of our methods to their setting.
Bocchi et al. [14] adopt multi-party session types to project the global protocol specifications of distributed networks to local types defining a local protocol for every process in the network that are then either verified statically via typechecking or enforced dynamically via suppression monitors. To implement this enforcement strategy, the authors define a dynamic monitoring semantics for the local types that suppress process interactions so as to conform to the assigned local specification. They prove local soundness and transparency for monitored processes that, in turn, imply global soundness and transparency by construction. Their local enforcement is closely related to the suppression enforcement studied in our work with the following key differences: (i) well-formed branches in a session type are, by construction, explicitly disjoint via the use of distinct choice labels (i.e., similar to our normalised subset sHML nf ), whereas we can synthesise enforcers for every sHML formula using a normalisation procedure; (ii) they give an LTS semantics to their local specifications (which are session types) which allows them to state that a process satisfies a specification when its behaviour is bisimilar to the operational semantics of the local specification-we do not change the semantics of our formulas, which is left in its original denotational form; (iii) they do not provide transparency guarantees for processes that violate a specification, along the lines of Definition 23; (iv) Our monitor descriptions sit at a lower level of abstraction than theirs using a dedicated language, whereas theirs have a session-type syntax with an LTS semantics (e.g., repeated suppressions have to be encoded in our case using the recursion construct while this is handled by their high-level instrumentation semantics).
In [16] , Castellani et al. adopt session types to define reading and writing privileges amongst processes in a network as global types for information flow purposes. These global types are projected into local monitors capable of preventing read and write violations by adapting certain aspects of the network. Although their work is pitched towards adaptation [26, 15] , rather than enforcement, in certain instances they adapt the network by suppressing messages or by replacing messages with messages carrying a default nonce value. It would be worthwhile investigating whether our monitor correctness criteria could be adapted or extended to this information-flow setting.
Future Work
We plan to extend this work along two different avenues. On the one hand, we will attempt to extend the enforceable fragment of µHML. For a start, we intend to investigate maximality results for suppression monitors, along the lines of [27, 2] . We also plan to consider more expressive enforcement mechanisms such as insertion and replacement actions. Finally, we will also investigate more elaborate instrumentation setups, such as the ones explored in [1] , that can reveal refusals in addition to the actions performed by the system.
On the other hand, we also plan to study the implementability and feasibility of our framework. We will consider target languages for our monitor descriptions that are closer to an actual implementation (e.g., an actor-based language along the lines of [28] ). We could then employ refinement analysis techniques and use our existing monitor descriptions as the abstract specifications that are refined by the concrete monitor descriptions. The more concrete synthesis can then be used for the construction of tools that are more amenable towards showing correctness guarantees. 
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A Proving Enforcement Correctness
In this section we present proofs ascertaining the correctness of our enforcers. We prove Theorem 14, by proving that the enforcers synthesised by our synthesis function are sound and transparent. We prove these two criteria in Appendices A.1 and A.2. Finally, we prove that our synthesised enforcers also abide by non-violating trace transparency in Appendix A.3. In order to facilitate our proofs we also use an alternative satisfaction semantics for sHML as explained below.
Alternative sHML Semantics
An alternative semantics for sHML was presented by Aceto et al. in [3, 4] in terms of a satisfaction relation, . When restricted to sHML, is the largest relation R satisfying the implications defined in Figure 4 . The satisfaction relation states that truth, tt, is always satisfied, while falsehood, ff, can never be satisfied. Conjunctions, i∈I ϕ i are satisfied when all branches are satisfied (i.e., ∀i ∈ I such that s ϕ i ), while necessities, [η]ϕ, are satisfied by a process s when all derivatives r that are reachable over an action α where η(α) = σ (possibly none), also satisfy ϕσ, i.e., r ϕσ. Finally, a process s satisfies a maximal fixpoint max X.ϕ when it is also able to satisfy an unfolded version of ϕ, i.e., s ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}.
The satisfaction semantics, s ϕ, agrees with the denotational semantics of the sHML subset of µHML, ϕ , presented in Figure 1 , so that s ϕ can be used in lieu of s ∈ ϕ (see [3, 4] for more detail).
A.1 Proving Soundness
To prove this lemma we must show that relation R (below) is a satisfaction relation ( ) as defined by the rules in Figure 4 .
Proof. We prove this claim by case analysis on the structure of ϕ.
Case ϕ = X. Does not apply since X is an open formula and thus X / ∈ Sat.
Case ϕ = ff. Does not apply since ff / ∈ Sat.
Case ϕ = tt. Holds trivially since every process satisfies tt, which thus confirms that ( tt [s], tt) ∈ R according to the definition of R.
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Case ϕ = max X.ϕ and X∈fv(ϕ).
We assume that
To prove that R is a satisfaction relation, we show that if ( max X.ϕ [s], max X.ϕ)∈R, then from the recursive unfolding ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}, we can also synthesise an enforcer ϕ{max X.ϕ/X} such that ( ϕ{max X.ϕ/X} [s], ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}) ∈ R as well. Hence, by (1) and the definition of Sat we know that ∃s · s max X.ϕ, and so by the definition of we can deduce that ∃s · s ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}, from which we can thus conclude
Finally, from (2) and the definition of R we conclude that
as required, and so we are done.
In this case we will be segmenting the set of indices I into I and I such that I contains the indices (if any) of the branches where the continuation formula ϕ i is a falsehood ff, while I contains the rest, and so we will be writing
We thus assume that
From (3) and the definition of − we have that
By unfolding the recursive construct in (4) we have that
In order to prove that R is a satisfaction relation, for this case we must show that every individual branch in (5) is in R as well. In order to show this we proceed by case analysis and show that the different types of branches that are synthesisable are also in R. Hence, for all i ∈ I, we consider the following cases:
In order to prove that this branch is in R it suffices showing that for all α and r,
This case holds trivially since by rules iTrn and eTrn we know that whenever s produces an action α such that symbolic action p i , c i is satisfied, i.e., p i , c i (α) = σ, the produced action α gets internally transformed into a silent (τ ) action, meaning that
= ⇒, and so the modal necessities leading to a falsehood (e.g., in this case [ p i , c i ]ff) never get satisfied by the monitored system.
Once again in order to prove that this branch is in R, we must show that for all α and r, when
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In order to show this we assume that
By the definition of α = ⇒ we know that the weak transition in (7) is composed from 0 or more τ -transitions followed by the α-transition as shown below
By the rules in our model we can infer that the τ -transitions performed in (8) (if any) are only possible via multiple applications of rule iAsy which allows us to deduce
Since we do not make any assumptions about the resultant enforced system r, we must first infer its form so to be able to deduce whether (r, ϕ i σ) ∈ R or not. Since the reduction in (10) can be the result of two instrumentation rules, namely iTer and iTrn, we consider both cases separately. iTer: As we assume that (10) is the result of rule iTer, by this rule we thus have
α − − →, which means that p i , c i (α) = undef which contradicts with assumption (6), and hence this case does not apply.
iTrn: By assuming that (10) is the result of rule iTrn, we thus know that
Hence, from (12) we know that to prove this case we must show that (
We thus refer to our initial assumption (3) from which by the definition of Sat we know that there exists some process q such that q
With the definition of we thus know that
Since from (9) and (11) we know that s α = ⇒ s , and so with the knowledge of (6), from (14) we can thus infer that s ϕ i σ meaning that ϕ i σ ∈ Sat. This result allows us to deduce that by the definition of R we conclude that
as required. Hence, from assumptions (6), (7) and deduction (15) we can infer that for j ∈ I we know that
as required, and we are done. Figure 5 The number of top level maximal fixed points.
A.2 Proving Transparency
To Prove.
To prove this lemma we show that relation R (below) is a strong bisimulation relation.
Hence we must show that R satisfies the following transfer properties for each (s,
We prove (a) and (b) separately by assuming that s ϕ in both cases as defined by relation R and conduct these proofs under the assumption that all our formulas are guarded, i.e., every occurrence of a logical variable X is always preceded by a modal necessity. It is common knowledge that every µ-Calculus formula (a reformulation of µHML) can converted into a semantically equivalent guarded formula of the same logic (see [10, 47] ). This allows us to conduct the proofs for both (a) and (b) by mathematical induction on the number of maximal fixed points declarations that occur at the topmost-level as defined by the rules in Figure 5 . Proof for (a). We proceed by mathematical induction of | ϕ | max .
Cases | ff | max = | X | max = 0. Both cases do not apply since s · s ff and similarly since X is an open-formula and so s · s X.
We now assume that
Since µ ∈ {τ, α}, we must consider both cases. µ =τ : Since µ =τ , we can apply rule iAsy on (2) and get
as required. Also, since we know that every process satisfies tt, we know that s tt, which by the definition of R we conclude
as required. This means that this subcase is done by (3) and (4). µ =α: Since by rule eId we know that id α α − −−− → id, and since µ =α, we can apply rule iTrn on (2) and deduce
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Since tt =id, we can refine (5) as
as required. Once again, since s tt, we can deduce
as required. This subcase is done by (6) and (7).
Since µ ∈ {τ, α}, we must consider both cases.
µ =τ : Since µ =τ , we can apply rule iAsy on (9) and obtain
as required. Since µ =τ , and since we know that sHML is τ -closed (see Proposition 3.8 in [3] ), from (8) and (9), we can deduce that s i∈I
as required. This subcase is therefore done by (10) and (11).
µ =α: Since µ = α, from (9) we know that
Since the branches in our conjunction are all prefixed by disjoint symbolic actions, i.e.,
# i∈I p i , c i , we know that at most one of the branches can match an action α. Hence, we consider two cases, namely:
(otherwise) , and since none of the guarding symbolic transformations in the synthesised selection can match action α, we conclude that
Since tt = id, by (13) and rule iTer we thus know
as required. Also, since any process satisfies tt, we know that s tt, and so by the definition of R we conclude that
as required. This subcase is therefore done by (14) and (15).
One matching branch (i.e., ∃j ∈ I · mtch( p j , c j , α) = σ): From (8) and by the definition of we know that for every index i ∈ I and process s ∈ Sys (s α = ⇒ s and p i , c i (α)=σ) imply s ϕ j σ, and so, since ∃j ∈ I · p j , c j (α)=σ, and from (12) we can deduce that
Also, since p j , c j (α)=σ, by rule eTrn we know that
By applying rules eSel, eRec on (17) and then (9) and iTrn we get
From (18) and the definition of − we can infer that m j = y and p = τ when m j is derived from ϕ j = ff, or m j = ϕ j and p = p j otherwise. By (16) we can deduce that the former is false because if ϕ j = ff, then this would contradict with (16), and hence only the latter applies. So, since ϕ j σ = m j σ and p j σ = α we have that
By (19) and the definition of − we can thus conclude that
as required, and by (16) and the definition of R we conclude that
as required. Hence, this subcase is done by (20) and (21).
We start by assuming that
µ =τ : Since µ =τ , we can apply rule iAsy on (23) and deduce that
as required. Also, since sHML is τ -closed (see Proposition 3.8 in [3]), by (22) and (23), we also know that s max X.ϕ as well. Hence, by the definition of R we conclude
and so we done by (24) and (25).
34:24
On Runtime Enforcement via Suppressions µ =α: Since µ = α, from (23) we know that
and by (22) and the definition of we know
Since we assume that logical variables (e.g., X) are guarded, by the definition of | ϕ | max we know that whenever a maximal fixed point max X.ϕ is unfolded into ϕ {max X.ϕ/X}, the number of top level maximal fixed points decreases by 1, and so since | max X.ϕ | max = l+1, we infer that
Hence, by (26), (27), (28) and the inductive hypothesis we can deduce that
By applying the definition of − on (29), followed by rule iTrn we get
By applying rule eRec on (31), followed by (26) and iTrn we get
and so, we can apply − on (32) and obtain
as required. We are therefore done by (30) and (33).
Proof for (b).
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction of | ϕ | max .
Cases | ff | max = | X | max = 0. Both cases do not apply since s · s ff and similarly since X is an open-formula and s · s X.
µ =τ : Since µ =τ , the transition in (35) can be performed either via iTrn or iAsy. We must therefore consider both cases. 
Since tt = id, by applying rule eId to (38) we know that m = id = tt , meaning that r = tt [r ]. Hence, since every process satisfies tt we know that s tt, so that by the definition of R we conclude
Hence, we are done by (37) and (39).
µ =τ : Since µ =τ , from (41) we know that
The τ -transition in (42) can be performed either via iTrn or iAsy; we thus consider both cases. iAsy: As we assume that the reduction in (42) is the result of rule iAsy, we know that 
and so we are done by (43) and (44). Hence, we are done by (65) and (66). iTrn: By assuming that the reduction in (62) was performed via rule iTrn and by the definition of − , we know that
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By applying rule eRec to (68), along with the definition of, − we can deduce that ϕ{max X.ϕ/X} α µ −−−→ m, so that by (67) and iTrn we have that
By (61) and the definition of we know that
Since we assume that logical variables (e.g., X) are guarded, by the definition of | ϕ | max we know that whenever a maximal fixed point max X.ϕ gets unfolded into ϕ {max X.ϕ/X}, the number of top level maximal fixed points decreases by 1, and so, since | max X.ϕ | max = l + 1 we infer that
Hence, by (69), (70), (71) and the inductive hypothesis we conclude that s µ − − → s and (s , r ) ∈ R as required, and so we are done.
A.3 Non-Violating Trace Transparency
(a) ∀s ∈ Sys, ϕ ∈ sHML nf · s, t v ϕ and s
The proofs for (a) and (b) rely on a number of auxiliary lemmas, namely, Lemmas 25 and 26 are required for proving (a) while Lemmas 25, 27 and 28 are necessary for proving (b). Before introducing these lemmas, in Figure 6 we introduce function after ϕ ::(sHML nf × Act) → sHML nf , denoting how an sHML nf formula is affected after evaluating with respect to some action µ. 
With the knowledge of (5) and (6) we can now apply the inductive hypothesis and infer that
Following this, by (3), (4) and Lemma 26 we have that
Finally, by joining together (7) and (8) with the definition of t = ⇒ we can conclude that
Proof for (b). By induction on the length of trace t.
Case t = ε. We assume that
From (2) and the definition of ε = ⇒ we know that
We now consider two cases for (3), namely, when 
and so by (1), (4) and Lemma 27 we can infer that
Hence, by (5), (7), (8) and the inductive hypothesis we conclude that
and so we can conclude by (6) and (9) that
Case ∀u · t = αu. We first assume that
By (10) and the definition of t = ⇒, we have that
and by (12) and the definition α = ⇒ we have that 
and by (15), (18) and Lemma 28 we have that
By (17), (19) and Lemma 25 we know that
With the knowledge of (13), (20) and (21) we can now apply the inductive hypothesis and infer that
Finally, by joining together (16), (19) and (22) To simplify the proof, we instead prove the contrapositive, i.e., Case after ϕ (tt, α). We assume that s α = ⇒ s and also that s , t v after ϕ (tt, α). This case, however, does not apply since by definition after ϕ (tt, α) = tt which contradicts the assumption that system s and trace t violate formula after ϕ (tt, α) = tt.
Case after ϕ (ff, α).
This case holds trivially since by the definition of v , we know that ff is violated regardless of the process or trace, such that we can immediately conclude that s, αt v ff as required.
Case after ϕ (max X.ϕ, α) .
We start this case by assuming that
s , t v after ϕ (max X.ϕ, α)
Since by definition after ϕ (max X.ϕ, α) = after ϕ (ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}, α), by (1), (2) 
∃j∈I · η j (α)=σ (5) By (4), (5) Proof. The proof proceeds by rule induction on after ϕ (ϕ, α).
Case after ϕ (tt, α).
Initially we assume that: after ϕ (tt, α) = tt, s, t v tt and that s α = ⇒ s from which we can deduce that
By applying multiple applications of rule iAsy on (1) we have that
Since tt = id, by rule eId we have that Case after ϕ (ff, α).
Since we assume that after ϕ (ff, α) = ff, s α − − → s , and that s, t v ff, this case does not apply since the last assumption does not hold because the definition of v states that ff is always violated.
We start by assuming that after ϕ (max X.ϕ, α) = after ϕ (ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}, α)
s, αt v max X.ϕ
From assumption (5) and by the definition of after ϕ we can deduce that ∃ϕ · after ϕ (ϕ{max X.ϕ/X}, α) = ϕ
and by applying the definition of v on assumption (7), we infer that
By knowing (6), (8) and (9) 
By (11) and eRec, we know
By (12) as required and so we are done.
Proving Lemma 27
To Prove. Cases iTer and iIns. These cases do not apply as iTer only transitions over visible actions α, while iIns cannot be applied as ϕ does not synthesise insertion monitors.
Case iAsy.
We assume that ∀t · s, t v ϕ (1)
Since the violation semantics are agnostic of τ -actions, from (1) and (3) we can deduce that
and so we are done by (3), (4) and (5).
